We don't even know where to start. That's the problem

The Nasdaq index rose 86% in 1999 alone, and peaked on March 10, 2000, at 5,048 units. The mega-merger of AOL with TimeWarner seemed to validate investors’ expectations about the “new economy”. Then the bubble imploded.

For institutional investors, 25 years is nothing. They must, by design, think beyond the duration of one person's career or even their lifetime. Longer than 75 years. In fact, it's longer than the founder's lifetime. On the other hand, the IPO market is a poly-oligopoly. You will read more about this concept later. Feel free to apply for the Ambixer Digest.

Why is AI not a solution to this? AI is essentially a language model trained on text and data. What kind of idiot would be CEO of a public company and collect information on how to cheat institutional investors?

I'm just curious: did institutional investors do their homework after the dot-com bubble caused $5 trillion (£3.9 trillion) to evaporate?

What are we thinking about for Institutional Investors?

As the person responsible for institutional investing

I want to know what I don’t know about new schemes used by entrepreneurs to inflate asset values, so that I can protect my interests and reduce the likelihood of a crisis in fund management.

As the person responsible for operations

I want to be sure that I understand the complexities, weaknesses and opportunities arising from the current multilevel ecosystem of market makers and the lack of regulation, so that I can fulfil my responsibilities for the technology and operations area's strategy and action plan.

As the person responsible for risk management

I want to be sure that I understand the risks created by the conflict of interest between entrepreneurial and institutional investing, so that I can find new ways to transfer risk and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy for companies in which the fund holds stakes.

As the person responsible for government relations

I want to be sure that I understand the difference between a lack of regulations and an absence of regulations, so that I can fulfil my duties relating to ownership and responsible investment activities, control and operational risk, compliance and legal services.

Key findings from ten years of investigations

Every market is made up of people. People pursue their own interests until they encounter resistance.
The 'cobra effect' occurs when an attempted solution to a problem actually makes it worse due to unintended human adaptation.

In the case of public corporations, this effect is driven by OKR-KPI-based compensation for C-level staff and short-term share pricing growth based on related metrics.

Over the course of a decade-long investigation, Vlad Shevtsov, Director of Investigations at Socialpuncher, discovered numerous anomalies in digital assets.

These anomalies indicate the existence of a global ecosystem of murky investments that profit from corporate wrongdoing against shareholders. This ecosystem arises from an imbalance of shareholder rights.

Vlad Shevtsov defined this class of assets as 'Parasitic Shadow Derivative Assets' (PSDA).

According to Vlad Shevtsov, this class of assets - Parasitic Shadow Derivative Assets are a sign of a 'black swan' event that the passive index investment strategy was not prepared for.

What questions should we ask when solving a PSDA puzzle for institutional investors?

...and many more questions

What problem does the PSDA product solve, and why does the host company consider it to be the best solution?

How big is the PSDA company, and which public companies does it target?

Who are PSDA's main competitors, and what sets these companies apart?

Why is the PSDA team uniquely qualified to build and grow this company without facing any consequences for the time being?

How can PSDA host company ties be identified, and which anomalies and conflicts of interest signal them?

What are the key products, business partners and development priorities of PSDA?

How do PSDA acquire host companies? How do they retain them? And how do they grow their base?

How much capital has PSDA raised, and how are the funds used?

What are the biggest risks to the host company's business?

We don't even know where to start. That's the problem

What are we thinking about for Institutional Investors?

As the person responsible for institutional investing

As the person responsible for operations

As the person responsible for risk management

As the person responsible for government relations

Key findings from ten years of investigations

What questions should we ask when solving a PSDA puzzle for institutional investors?

How does PSDA's declared business model generate revenue?

How does it actually make a profit from the host-company's CAPEX, OPEX and cash-flow?

Which factors, such as a lack of disclosure, intellectual asymmetry of knowledge or competitive market structure, protect PSDA businesses?

What is the current financial performance of PSDA, and which of the host company's key business metrics are inflated?

How can shareholders find out if management is rejecting mitigation strategies in favour of the PSDA?

...and many more questions

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